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Nearing the end of its second decade, the crisis of fatal opioid-involved
overdoses in the United States has gone from bad to worse. In 2017,
approximately 72,000 people died of a drug overdose in the United States.'
Overdose is now the leading cause of death for people under fifty. 2 There is
broad agreement that reducing opioid overdose deaths requires wider
distribution of the opioid antidote naloxone, 3 rapid scale-up in evidence-based
treatment,4 and reducing the stigma associated with substance use and

1.

FARIDA B. AHMAD ET AL., PROVISIONAL DRUG OVERDOSE DEATH COUNTS

(2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-data.htm.
2.
Josh Katz, Drug Deaths in America Are RisingFasterThan Ever, N.Y. TIMES (June
5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-over
dose-deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html.
3.
See LINDSAY LASALLE, AN OVERDOSE DEATH IS NOT MURDER: WHY DRUGINDUCED HOMICIDE LAWS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND INHUMANE 4 (2017),
https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/dpa drug induced homicide report 0.pdf.

4.

See id.
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addiction.' However, progress on these and other vital public health
interventions remains abysmally slow. 6 Meanwhile, there is a new and

growing trend in enforcing drug-induced homicide and similar laws in
overdose death cases. Originally intended to implicate dealers in accidental
drug overdoses, such charges were rarely brought until recent years. 7 Just
since 2010, however, media coverage of prosecutions based on such
provisions has spiked at least threefold, from 363 in 2011 to 1,178 in 2016.
Drug-induced homicide statutes emerged during the height of the "drugs
and crime" era of crack-cocaine. 9 These provisions were passed under the
assumption that they would be used to prosecute major drug traffickers for
deaths that their products caused.'o Under pressure to find solutions to
mounting overdose deaths, prosecutors and police began to use these
provisions with increasing frequency and fervor, largely ensnaring low-level
drug dealers, as well as individuals who do not fit the characterization of a
"dealer."" Analyses by the Health in Justice Action Lab' 2 and by the New
York Times1 3 revealed that the majority of these drug-induced homicide cases
do not involve "traditional" drug dealers, but rather friends, family, and cousers of the overdosed decedent. Additionally, in cases that do involve
organized drug distribution, there is a high likelihood of racial bias. Health in
Justice Action Lab's analysis suggests that a disproportionate number of
charges are being brought in cases where the victim is non-Hispanic white and
the dealer is a person of color, and that people of color accused of druginduced homicide or similar crimes receive sentences 2.1 years longer, on

&

5.
See Wayne D. Hall & Michael Farrell, Reducing the Opioid Overdose Death Toll in
North America, PLOS MED., at 2 (July 31, 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC6067703.
6.
See German Lopez, How to Stop the Deadliest Drug Overdose Crisis in American
History, Vox (Dec. 21, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/1/
15746780/opioid-epidemic-end.
7.
See LASALLE, supra note 3, at 11.
8.
See generally id. at 2 (noting the increase in press coverage of drug-induced homicide
prosecutions).
9.
See Bobby Allyn, Bystanders To Fatal Overdoses Increasingly Becoming Criminal
Defendants,
NPR
(July
2,
2018,
5:04
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/
07/02/623327129/bystanders-to-fatal-overdoses-increasingly-becoming-criminal-defendants.
10. See LASALLE, supra note 3, at 9 (quoting Act of June 4, 2003, 2003 Vt. Acts
Resolves 141).
11. See id. at 3,11, 14.
12. See Drug InducedHomicide, HEALTH INJUSTICE ACTION LAB, https://www.health
injustice.org/drug-induced-homicide (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
13. See Rosa Goldensohn, They SharedDrugs. Someone Died. Does that Make Them
Killers?, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/us/drug-overdoseprosecution-crime.html.
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average, than white defendants.' 4 For individuals suffering from Opioid Use
Disorder who are convicted in these cases, they face an enormous spike in risk
of death from overdose during the first few weeks after release.' 5 There are
many problems with these arrests and prosecutions, and much remains to be
learned. We hope that this Article will assist defenders and families and,
perhaps with time, will encourage police and prosecutors to focus their
resources on more effective strategies for reducing crime and delinquency.
This Article is intended to serve as an informational guide for defense
counsel and other interested parties working to mount a defense for
individuals charged with drug-induced homicide or similar crimes resulting
from overdoses. The creation of this Article was spurred by two related trends:
(1) information from parents, news reports, and other sources about
inadequate legal defense being provided to many individuals charged with
these crimes, and (2) widespread efforts by prosecutors to disseminate
information and tools that aid other prosecutors and law enforcement
personnel in investigating and bringing drug-induced homicide and related
charges, including presentations at conferences,1 6 continuing legal education
modules, webinars, 7 and the like.
This Article has been produced in conjunction with the Health in Justice
Action Lab, which aims to inject scientific evidence and public health
principles into the conversation in order to level the playing field in this
rapidly expanding prosecutorial offensive. A living document version of this
paper is published online by the Health in Justice Action Lab as Drug-Induced
Homicide Defense Toolkit.'" Finally, an explainer on drug-induced homicide
laws and prosecutions for parents and family members is available through
the New York Times Q&A for readers.' 9
Today, almost half of state jurisdictions have a special statute that can be
used to mount a drug-induced homicide prosecution.20 Although the laws all

14. Drug InducedHomicide, supra note 12.
15. See Shabbar I. Ranapurwala et al., Opioid Overdose Mortality Among Former North
CarolinaInmates: 2000-2015, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1207, 1209 (2018).
16. See Law Enforcement Track, NATIONAL RX DRUG ABUSE & HEROIN SUMMIT (last
updated Mar. 25, 2016), http://nationalrxdrugabusesummit.org/law-enforcement/#LEN4.
17. See Webinars, SMART PROSECUTION: Ass'N OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS,
https://www.smartprosecution.org/recent-webinars (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
18. Valena E. Beety et al., Drug-InducedHomicide Defense Toolkit (Ohio State Public
Law Working Paper No. 467, Oct. 12, 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3265510.
19. Rosa Goldensohn, You're Not a Drug Dealer? Here's Why the Police Might
Disagree, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/us/overdosesmurder-crime-police.html.
20. The Lab is currently collaborating with Mission LISA on developing a
comprehensive dataset of drug-induced homicide statutes and their elements. As of this writing,

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/8
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existing statutes include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.120(a)(3) (West, Westlaw
through 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 30th Leg.), Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3102(1)(e) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 71st General Assembly),
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg.
Sess. of the 25th Leg.), Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3.3 (West, through P.A. 1001165 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.), Louisiana, LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(3)-(4) (Westlaw through
the 2018 Third Extraordinary Sess.) Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317a (West,
Westlaw current through P.A.2018, No. 682-685 of the 2018 Reg. Sess., 99th Michigan Leg.
(excluding other Nos.)) Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195(b) (West, Westlaw through
the end of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(IX)
(Westlaw, through Chapter 379 of the 2018 Reg. Sess., and C.A.C.R. 15 and 16), New Jersey,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West, Westlaw through L.2018, c. 169 and J.R. No. 14), North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-17(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145 of the
2018 Reg. and Extra Sess. of the General Assemb., subject to changes made pursuant to direction
of the Revisor of Statutes), Pennsylvania, 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 2506(a)-(b)

(West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Act 164 (End)), Rhode Island, 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-23-6 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 353 of the January 2018 session) (only applies to
drug delivery to a minor), Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(a)(2)-(3) (West,
Westlaw through end of the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 110th Tennessee General Assemb.),

Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4250 (West, Westlaw through all acts of the Adjourned
Sess, of the 2017-2018 Vermont General Assemb. (2018) and through all acts of the First Spec.
Sess. of the Adjourned Sess. of the 2017-2018 Vermont General Assemb. (2018)), Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.415 (West, Westlaw through all legislation from the 2018
Reg. Sess. of the Washington Leg.), West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (West,
Westlaw through legislation of the 2018 First Extraordinary Sess.); State v. Jenkins, 729 S.E.2d
250, 263 (W.Va. 2012) ("[D]eath resulting from an overdose of a controlled substance . .
and
occurring in the commission of or attempt to commit a felony offense of manufacturing or
delivering such controlled substance, subjects the manufacturer or deliverer of the controlled
substance to the felony murder rule.") (quoting State v. Rodoussakis, 511 S.E.2d 469, 476

(1998)), Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.02(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 370,
published December 15, 2018), Wyoming, WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (West, Westlaw
through the 2018 Budget Sess. of the Wyoming Leg.).
Statutes also being utilized: California, CAL. PENAL CODE

§

192(b) (West, Westlaw

through Ch. 1016 of 2018 Reg. Sess., and all propositions on 2018 ballot) (Involuntary
manslaughter), Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56 (West, Westlaw through
General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1958, Revised to January 1, 2019), Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-3 (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Reg. and Spec. legislative sessions),
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-5 (West, Westlaw through all legislation and ballot issues
of the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. and First Spec. Sess. of the 120th General Assembly), Iowa,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.5 (West, Westlaw through legislation from the 2018 Reg. Sess.,
subject to changes made by Iowa Code Editor for Code 2019), Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507.050 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Reg. Sess.); Lofthouse v. Com., 13

S.W.3d 236, 241 (Ky. 2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973 (Mass. 1990))
("[G]uilt of criminal homicide, like any other offense, depends upon proof."), Maryland, MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-207 (West, Westlaw through all legislation from the 2018 Reg.
Sess. of the General Assemb.), Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 265 § 13 (West,

Westlaw through Chapter 349, except Ch. 337, of the 2018 2nd Ann. Sess.); Catalina, 407
N.E.2d at 980 (noting person who furnishes drug to another, who voluntarily consumes it and
dies as a result, may be liable for manslaughter because consumption of the drug was a
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use an analogous instrumental framework, these provisions use a variety of
criminal law mechanisms, including felony murder, depraved heart offenses,
and involuntary manslaughter. At the extreme end of the punitive spectrum,
among these laws' there are provisions like West Virginia's, which imposes
sentences of up to life in prison. 21
Some of these provisions are strict liability statutes requiring no criminal
intent (mens rea). 22 Others require a recklessness or criminal negligence
standard to be met.23 However, none of the state or federal provisions require
a financial exchange to take place or exclude small-time dealers or fellow
users from prosecution; those being charged with an underlying trafficking
offense involving higher drug quantities may face stiffer penalties. 24 It should
be noted, however, that a specialized drug-induced homicide or similar statute
is not necessary for an individual to be charged in a fatal overdose: criminal
negligence or other generic statutes can and are being strategically
deployed in these cases. 25
II.

AVAILABLE DEFENSES

Presently there are two primary avenues for defending against
prosecutions under drug-induced homicide statutes. 26 First, in cases that

foreseeable consequence of his actions), Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.024 (West, Westlaw
through the end of the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. and First Extraordinary Sess. of the 99th General
Assembly), Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.070 (West, Westlaw through the end of the
79th Reg. Sess. (2017) of the Nevada Leg.), Sheriff, Clark Cty. v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852, 854
(Nev. 1983) ("In context of unlawful sale of controlled substances resulting in death, seconddegree felony-murder rule may be premised on either felonious intent provision or unlawful
act .. . .") (citing West Headnote); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.10, 125.15
(McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, chapters I to 8), North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 12.1-16-02 (West, Westlaw through the 2017 Reg. Sess. of the 65th Legis. Assemb. and results
of the Nov. 6, 2018, election), Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (West, Westlaw through
Files 170 and 172 of the 132nd General Assemb. (2017-2018), 2017 State Issue 1, and 2018
State Issue 1) (excluding other Files), Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West, Westlaw
through the end of the 2017 Reg. and First Called Sess. of the 85th Leg.); Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-33 (West, Westlaw through End of the 2018 Reg. Sess. and End of the 2018 Sp.
Sess. I).
21.

W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 61-2-2

(West, Westlaw through legislation of the 2018 First

Extraordinary Sess.).
22. See sources cited supra note 20.
23. See sources cited supra note 20.
24. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-281).
25. See LASALLE, supra note 3, at 2.
26. If the defendant has been charged under a statute that includes a mens rea element,
insufficient evidence of the requisite mental state may also be a viable defense. Because many
drug-induced homicide statutes impose strict liability and the required mental state varies among

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/8
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involve a user who was sharing drugs with another user, the joint-user (also
known as joint-purchaser) defense may apply. This defense can undermine
the distribution charge that is an essential element of drug-induced homicide
prosecutions. Second, the defense can challenge the prosecution's effort to
establish causation that the drug(s) in question were the legal cause of the
decedent's overdose.
A.

The Joint-UserDefense
1.

Overview

The joint-user doctrine provides that when "two individuals
simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a drug for their own use,
intending only to share it together, their only crime is personal drug abusesimple joint possession, without any intent to distribute the drug further." 27
The legal basis for this rule is that users who jointly acquire drugs to use with
each other are in either constructive or actual possession of the drugs from the
time of the purchase. 28 Because a person cannot distribute an item to someone
who already possesses it, joint-purchasers cannot be convicted of distributing
drugs to each other. In the words of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
Morrison,29 "[i]t hardly requires stating that the 'transfer' of a controlled
substance cannot occur . .. if the intended recipient already possesses that
substance." 30

In cases where the joint-user defense applies, it can defeat the underlying
charge of distribution. Because distribution is the foundation of every druginduced homicide prosecution, a successful joint-user defense will also defeat
the drug-induced homicide charge.
Significantly, because a joint-user claim is not an affirmative defense but
an argument that the evidence does not establish distribution as a matter of
law, it can potentially be grounds for dismissing the charges before trial, as
demonstrated by State v. Morrison, discussed below.

non-strict liability drug-induced homicide statutes, this Article does not analyze mens rea-based
defenses.
27. United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1977).
28. See id. at 448, 450.
29. 902 A.2d 860 (N.J. 2006).
30. Id. at 867.
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Application to Drug-InducedHomicide Prosecutions

In People v. Edwards,3' the California Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's convictions for furnishing heroin and for felony-murder (with the
furnishing charge as the predicate felony) where "the trial court erred in failing
to instruct the jury that defendant could not be convicted of furnishing heroin
to Rogers if he and Rogers were merely co[-]purchasers of the heroin." 3 2
Relying on a prior California case,33 the court found that:
The distinction drawn ... between one who sells or furnishes heroin
and one who simply participates in a group purchase seems to us a
valid one, at least where the individuals involved are truly "equal
partners" in the purchase and the purchase is made strictly for each
individual's personal use. Under such circumstances, it cannot
reasonably be said that each individual has "supplied" heroin to the
others. We agree with defendant that there was substantial evidence
from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that he and
Rogers were equal partners in both the financing and execution of the
heroin purchase. 3 4

What is required to demonstrate that the defendant and the decedent were
joint-users? The key question, in the words of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Morrison, is "whether defendant distributed the heroin to [the decedent] or
whether both jointly possessed the heroin at the time defendant purchased the
drug from the street dealer." 35 Under this principle, the joint-user defense does
not apply where one person purchased drugs on her own and later shared the
drugs with a friend; that sort of social sharing is still considered to be
distribution.3 6 IIstead, both users must have possessed the drugs from the
outset. The court in Morrison concluded, based on its review of relevant case
law, that the joint-user inquiry requires a "fact-sensitive analysis." 3 7

31. 702 P.2d 555 (Cal. 1985).
32. Id. at 556.
33. The Edwards court did not use the terms "joint-user" or "joint-purchaser" and did not
cite to any joint-user cases, including the seminal joint-user case United States v. Swiderski,
suggesting that they might have been unaware of these cases. Nevertheless, the decision in
Edwards closely tracks the joint-user cases.
34. Edwards, 702 P.2d at 559 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
35. 902 A.2d at 867.
36. See United States v. Wallace, 532 F.3d 126, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2008).
37. 902 A.2d at 870.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/8
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Among the factors to be considered are whether the relationship of
the parties is commercial or personal, the statements and conduct of
the parties, the degree of control exercised by one over the other,
whether the parties traveled and purchased the drugs together, the
quantity of the drugs involved, and whether one party had sole
possession of the controlled dangerous substance for any significant
length of time.38
In that case, Lewis Morrison was charged with the drug-induced death of
his friend Daniel Shore.3 9 In New Jersey, the statute is a strict liability crime. 40
Morrison and Shore had "pooled their money ... [and] bought four decks of
heroin" at around 3 a.m. one morning. 41 Morrison and Shore were together
when they bought the heroin, but Morrison negotiated the purchase and took
the initial physical control of the heroin. 42 Morrison "placed the decks in his
pocket and, after driving out of the city, gave one to Shore." 43 Morrison and
Shore drove to Morrison's house and used the heroin they had purchased. 44
Shore died of a heroin overdose a few hours later. 45
After conducting its "fact-sensitive analysis," the court determined that
Shore possessed the drugs from the start, noting that Morrison and Shore were
friends; that they pooled their money together to make the purchase; and, that
Shore was physically present at the time of the purchase. 46 The court
concluded as follows:

3 8. Id
39. See id at 862. In this case, a grand jury indicted and defense counsel moved to dismiss
the drug-induced death and distribution charges prior to trial on the grounds that the prosecutor
had presented insufficient evidence to support them. See id at 864. The trial court agreed, and
the State appealed. See id.
The case made its way to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Relying on the joint-user
doctrine, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the charges against
Morrison. See id at 871.
40. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9(a) (West, Westlaw through L.2019, c. 38) ("Any
person who manufactures, distributes or dispenses methamphetamine, lysergic acid
diethylamide, phencyclidine or any other controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedules
I or II, or any controlled substance analog thereof, in violation of subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:355, is strictly liable for a death which results from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that
substance, and is guilty of a crime of the first degree.").
41. Morrison, 902 A.2d at 862-63.
42. See id. at 863.
43. Id
44. Id
45. See id. at 863-64.
46. See id. at 870-71.
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The evidence clearly implies that when defendant bought the four
decks both were in joint possession of the drugs that is, defendant
had actual possession and Shore constructive possession of the
heroin. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
we agree with the trial court that because defendant and Shore
simultaneously and jointly acquired possession of the drugs for their
own use, intending only to share it together, defendant cannot be
charged with the crime of distribution. 4 7
3.

Analyzing the Simultaneous Acquisition Requirement

Courts are split on how they interpret the joint-user doctrine's
requirement that the drugs be simultaneously acquired. Some courts have held
or implied that users must be physically present at the time of purchase to be
joint-possessors. Other courts have taken a more holistic approach, finding
that the defense may apply where users pool their money to buy drugs even if
they are not both physically present for the purchase.
a. DecisionsRequiringPhysicalPresence
A majority of courts that have addressed the issue have held or implied
that physical presence at the purchase is a prerequisite for the joint-user
defense to apply. In United States v. Wright,48 for example, the Ninth Circuit
held the defendant was not entitled to the "joint user" defense to possession
with intent to distribute where a friend:
[a]sked him to procure heroin so that they might use it together; she
gave him $20 with which to buy the heroin but did not tell him where
to buy it; he left her dwelling and procured the heroin; then he
brought the heroin back and they "snorted" it together. 49
Because Wright and his friend had not acquired the heroin
"simultaneously,""o the court found Wright's conduct constituted
"distribution." 5 ' Specifically, the court concluded that by purchasing the
heroin, "Wright facilitated the transfer of the narcotic; he did not simply

47. See id. at 871 (citations omitted).
48. 593 F.2d 105 (1979).
49. Id. at 108.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 106.
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'simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a drug for their [his and
another's] own use."' 5 2

b.

DecisionsNot Requiring PhysicalPresence

Some courts have held or implied that both users need not be physically
present for the joint-user defense to apply. These jurisdictions still require
simultaneous acquisition of the substance but, citing the principles of
constructive possession, hold that a person can acquire possession of an item
without being physically present at the point of sale.
In State v. Carithers,3 for example, the Supreme Court of Minnessota
held that "[i]f a husband and wife jointly acquire the drug, each spouse has
constructive possession from the moment of acquisition, whether or not both
are physically present at the transaction." 5 4 In Carithers, the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered a consolidated appeal of two cases involving
prosecutions under a drug-induced homicide felony murder statute." In one
of the two cases, the defendant:

52. Id. at 108 (alterations in original). For additional cases holding or suggesting that
physical presence is required, see United States v. Mancuso, 718 F.3d 780, 798 (9th Cir. 2013)
(footnote omitted) ("Even assuming the Swiderskirule was binding in the Ninth Circuit, it would
not apply to Mancuso's case, because the record does not support finding that any of the
witnesses pooled money with Mancuso and traveled with him to acquire the cocaine jointly,
intending only to share it together."); People v. Coots, 968 N.E.2d 1151, 1158 (Ill. Ct. App.
2012) (joining the courts that "have held that the fact that two or more people have paid for
drugs will not prevent one of them from being guilty of delivery or distribution-or intent to
deliver or distribute-if he alone obtains the drugs at a separate location and then returns to share
their use with his co-purchasers."); State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 30 (Iowa 1999) (declining
to apply the joint-user "rationale where both owners did not actively and equally participate in
the purchase of the drugs, even though the drugs were acquired for the personal use of the joint
owners."); United States v. Washington, 41 F.3d 917, 920 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[A] defendant who
purchases a drug and shares it with a friend has 'distributed' the drug even though the purchase
was part of ajoint venture to use drugs."); State v. Shell, 501 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)
(rejecting a joint-user argument where, although "Decedent requested that Defendant purchase
the heroin for both men, Defendant was the one who, on his own, purchased the heroin from his
drug dealer with his own money and delivered it to Decedent.").
53. 490 N.W.2d 620 (Minn. 1992).
54. Id. at 622.
55. See id. at 620-21 ("Minnesota Statute § 609.195(b) (1990) is a special felony murder
statute declaring it murder in the third degree if one, without intent to kill, proximately causes
the death of another person by furnishing that is, 'directly or indirectly, unlawfully selling,
giving away, bartering, delivering, exchanging, distributing, or administering'-a schedule I or
II controlled substance.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 8
718

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 707

went by herself to buy the heroin, but it appears undisputed that she
was buying not just for herself but for her husband also. She brought
the heroin home and used her half. After showing her husband where
she hid the heroin, she left the house. During her absence, her
husband prepared a syringe and injected himself. He ... died of an
overdose. 56
The court held that the joint-user defense applied because the defendant's
husband constructively possessed the heroin as soon as it was purchased. 1
The court reasoned that, when a person is buying drugs on behalf of an absent
spouse:
[t]he absent spouse could be charged with constructive possession at
any time following the purchase by his or her confederate. That the
absent spouse did not exercise physical control over the substance at
the moment of acquisition is an irrelevancy when there is no question
that the absent spouse was then entitled to exercise joint physical
possession."
Accordingly, the joint-user defense applied and the court upheld dismissal of
the felony murder charges. 9
The New Jersey Supreme Court's multi-factor, "fact-sensitive" test for
determining whether users simultaneously acquired possession appears to
take a similar approach. 60 Although physical presence was one of the factors
in the New Jersey Supreme Court's test, it was not described as a necessary
condition for the defense to apply. Moreover, the other factors-particularly
"whether one party had sole possession of the controlled dangerous substance
for any significant length of time"-suggest that users who pool their money
to buy drugs to use shortly after the purchase might qualify for the defense,
regardless of whether both were physically present at the sale. 61

56. Id
57. See id. at 622.
58. Id
59. A number of courts have read Carithersto represent a broad application of the jointuser rule in comparison to cases like Wright. A recent Minnesota appeals court decision,
however, read Carithers narrowly and suggested it may apply only to spouses who jointly
purchase drugs. See State v. Schnagl, 907 N.W.2d 188, 199 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) ("The
aforementioned cases indicate that the holding in Carithers is narrow, and the existence of a
marriage relationship is an important element in establishing joint acquisition and possession for
purposes of a defense.").
60. State v. Morrison, 902 A.2d 860, 870 (N.J. 2006).
61. Id. (citation omitted).
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Arguments in Support of a Broad Application of the
Simultaneous Acquisition Requirement

In cases where a defendant seeks to raise a joint-user defense, the scope
of the simultaneous acquisition/possession rule is likely to be a key point of
contention. Most jurisdictions have not yet resolved this question. Although a
majority of courts to have considered the issue have held that both users must
be physically present at the sale for the joint-user defense to apply, there are
strong policy and doctrinal arguments in favor of a broader application of the
defense.
i.

The ConstructivePossessionDoctrine

It is well established in law that a person can constructively possess an
item that has not yet been delivered into his or her actual possession. Indeed,
in possession prosecutions, the government often argues for a broad
construction of constructive possession. These cases have led courts to hold
that "a defendant also may be convicted of possession . .. of a controlled
substance when his or her dominion and control are exercised through the acts
of an agent." 62
For instance, in People v. Konrad,63 the Michigan Supreme Court held
that the defendant constructively possessed cocaine where the evidence
showed he "had paid for the drugs and that they were his-that is, that he had
the intention and power . .. to exercise control over them." 64 Specifically, the
evidence showed that the defendant had:
made a prior arrangement with Joel Hamp and others to purchase a
kilogram of cocaine, that he had already paid for the cocaine, that he
told Joel to come to his house about seven that evening, and that, after
he had been arrested, he had instructed his wife to direct Joel not to
come. Joel arrived after 6:30 p.m. and acknowledged that he had
something for the defendant.65
The court concluded that, although the drugs had never been in the
defendant's physical presence, he constructively possessed them at the time

62. People v. Morante, 975 P.2d 1071, 1080 (1999) (citations omitted).
63. 536 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. 1995).
64. Id. at 522.
65. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 8
720

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 707

his agent purchased them. 66 This is because a person "may constructively

possess substances that their agents have bought for them." 67
Similarly, the California Supreme Court has held that a person who
directs an agent to purchase contraband for him is guilty of possession as soon
as the purchase is completed. 68 In People v. White, the defendant, Frank
White, asked his roommate Conover to buy some heroin for him. 69 Conover
made the purchase while White was at work and left the heroin on White's
dresser. 70 The police found the heroin before White arrived home from
work. 7 ' Even though White had physical access to the heroin, the court
sustained his possession conviction. 72 The court reasoned that because
Conover bought the heroin "pursuant to [White's] express instructions,"
White "had constructive possession as soon as the narcotic was acquired for
him, and it is immaterial whether he had personal knowledge of the presence
of the narcotic in the apartment." 73

This principle should apply with equal force in the context of the jointuser doctrine. The Carithers court based its holding on this rationale,
concluding that because "[t]he absent spouse could be charged with
constructive possession at any time following the purchase by his or her
confederate," the joint-user rule should apply. 74 Requiring both users to be
physically present at the purchase for the joint-user rule to apply lets the
government have it both ways, defining constructive possession broadly when
it supports a conviction (i.e., to a constructive possession defendant) but
narrowly when it supports the joint-user defense. This should be reason
enough for courts to reject decisions like the Ninth Circuit's in Wright and to
follow decisions like the Minnesota Supreme Court's in Carithers.
ii.

The Challenges of Elucidating the Physical
Presence Aspect of the Simultaneous Purchase
Requirement

The simultaneous purchase requirement can become farcical if physical
presence is also required and taken to the extreme. In the Seventh Circuit case

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id. at 520-23.
Id. at 522.
People v. White, 325 P.2d 985, 987 (Cal. 1958) (en banc).
Id. at 986.
Id.
Id.
Id at 987.
Id.
State v. Carithers, 490 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Minn. 1992).
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Weldon v. United States,,7 for example, the court expressly rejected the
government's argument that both users must physically interact with the seller
to be joint-possessors.
The government argues (with no judicial support) that the holding of
Swiderski is inapplicable to this case because "Weldon was the only
one of the three to get out of Roth's car and conduct a hand-to-hand
exchange of money for heroin with the dealer." The implication is
that the rule of Swiderski requires absurd behavior. Imagine Weldon,
Roth, and Fields squeezing into the dealer's car and each handing the
dealer a separate handful of money. What on earth would the dealer
think of such antics? How would he react? What would he do? If he
gave them the drug would they have to divide it on the spot in order
to avoid being guilty of distribution? What matters is that the [users]
were participants in the same transaction. No cases require literal
simultaneous possession; Swiderski and another decision (very much
like the present case) implicitly reject such a requirement. 76
However, the Seventh Circuit did not elaborate on the question of what it
means for both users to have been "participants in the same transaction,"
because of the posture of the case-a motion to vacate a guilty plea as a result
of ineffective assistance of counsel.77
4.

Arguing for a Broad Application of the Joint-User Rule
Based on DistinguishingUsersfrom Sellers

A broad application of the joint-user rule is also supported by the policy
goals of linking penalties to culpability while also distinguishing, to the extent
possible, between users and people who are involved in the drug trade. These
policy goals are inherent in the structure of drug laws and have sometimes
been expressly stated by legislators. This was a motivating consideration in
the court's decision in Morrison:
The Legislature stated that "it is the policy of this State to distinguish
between drug offenders based on the seriousness of the offense,
considering principally the nature, quantity and purity of the

75. 840 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2016).
76. See id. at 867.
77. Id. (first citing United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 448 (2nd Cir. 1977); then
citing United States v. Speer, 30 F.3d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1994)).
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controlled substance involved, and the role of the actor in the overall
drug distribution network.". . . In passing the Act, the Legislature
deemed the sentencing guidelines under the old drug laws inadequate
in "identify[ing] the most serious offenders and offenses and [in]
guard[ing] against sentencing disparity.". . . The consequences of a
finding of distribution are significantly greater than that of
possession. Whereas the maximum term of imprisonment for
distributing heroin that causes a person's drug-induced death is
twenty years,. . . the maximum term for possession of heroin is only
five years .

. .

. The Legislature expected the criminal culpability of

parties to bear some proportion to their conduct. 71
B.

Causation

Causation is an important issue in many drug-induced homicide
prosecutions. As summarized by the Supreme Court in Burrage v. United
States,
[t]he law has long considered causation a hybrid concept, consisting
of two constituent parts: actual cause and legal cause . . . . When a

crime requires "not merely conduct but also a specified result of
conduct," a defendant generally may not be convicted unless his
conduct is "both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the 'legal' cause (often
called the 'proximate cause') of the result."

79

Accordingly, defense counsel may choose to litigate the traditional
causation requirements-including the actual (or but-for) causation and the
legal (or proximate) causation-in drug-induced death prosecutions.

78. State v. Morrison, 902 A.2d 860, 870 (N.J. 2006) (alteration in original) (first quoting
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1.1(c) (West, Westlaw through L.2018, c. 169 and J.R. No. 14); then
quoting § 2C:35-1.1(d); then citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9(a) (West, Westlaw through
L.2018, c. 169 and J.R. No. 14); then citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West, Westlaw
through L.2018, c. 169 and J.R. No. 14); then citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-10(a)(1) (West,
Westlaw through L.2018, c. 169 and J.R. No. 14); and then citing § 2C:43-6(a)(3)); see also,
Swiderski, 548 F.2d at 449. The Swiderski court noted that in interpreting criminal drug laws "it
is important to understand their place in the statutory drug enforcement scheme as a whole,
which draws a sharp distinction between drug offenses of a commercial nature and illicit
personal use of controlled substances." Swiderski, 548 F.2d at 449.

79.

571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014) (first citing H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION

IN THE LAW 104 (1959); then quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

§ 6.4(a)

(2nd ed. 2003)).
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This section discusses both requirements as well as the intervening actor
doctrine. Specific strategies for raising causation issues at trial-including
challenging the methodology of the prosecution's medical expert, hiring a
toxicologist or forensic pathologist to testify regarding the cause of death, and
closely scrutinizing the death certificate and medical examiner autopsy
report are discussed in Part III below.
1.

But-For Causation

Under traditional causation principles, the first step to determining
whether a defendant's acts caused death is the but-for causation requirement.
But-for causation "represents 'the minimum requirement for a finding of
causation when a crime is defined in terms of conduct causing a particular
result."'so But-for causation requires the prosecutor to prove that, but for the
defendant's acts, the harm would not have occurred when it did." Although
but-for causation is easily met in most traditional homicide prosecutions, it is
often in dispute in drug-induced death prosecutions. 82
In Burrage, the United States Supreme Court resolved the question of
whether but-for causation applies to the federal drug-induced death statute. 83
The law levies heavy mandatory minimum penalties in some controlledsubstance prosecutions-including, in some situations, life sentences for
individuals previously convicted of drug felonies "if death or serious bodily
injury results from the use of' the substance. 84 For a time, courts were split
on the question of whether the traditional but-for causation principles applied
to this statute or whether, by using the phrase "results from," Congress
indicated an intent to apply a broader approach to causation. " In Burrage, the
Supreme Court held that but-for causation is required under the federal
statute. 86

80.

Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211 (quoting Model Penal Code § 203(1)(a)).

81.

See

Causation, LAWSHELF

EDUC.

MEDIA,

https://1awshelfcom/courseware/

entry/causation (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
82. See LASALLE, supra note 3, at 41; see also Thomas P. Gilson et al., Rules for
Establishing Causation in Opiate/Opioid Overdose Prosecutions-The Burrage Decision, 7
ACAD. FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 87, 88 (2017).
83. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 206.
84. 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-338); see also 21
U.S.C.A. § 960(b)(1)-(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-338) (stating penalties).
85. See Benjamin Ernst, A Simple Concept in a Complicated World: Actual Causation,
Mixed-Drug Deaths and the Eighth Circuit's Opinion in United States v. Burrage, 55 B.C.L.
REV. E. Supp. 1, 2 (2014).
86. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 218-19.
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Burrage involved the death of Joshua Banka, "a long-time drug user."17
On the day Banka died, he smoked marijuana and then injected crushed
oxycodone pills he had stolen from a roommate." Later, Banka and his wife
bought one gram of heroin from Burrage.8 9 Burrage injected some of the
heroin and was found dead by his wife a few hours later. 90 The police found
a number of drugs in Banka's house and car, including alprazolam,
clonazepam, oxycodone, and hydrocodone. 9' At Burrage's trial, two medical
experts testified that the heroin was a contributing factor in Banka's death. 92
But neither was able to say "whether Banka would have lived had he not taken
the heroin." 93 The trial court declined to give Burrage's requested jury
instructions on causation and denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. 94
Burrage was convicted and sentenced to twenty years under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(C). 95 The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 9 6
The Supreme Court reversed Burrage's conviction and held that the
"results from" language in the statute "imposes a requirement of but-for
causation." 97 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that it had
previously held similar language requires but-for causation in other
contexts. 98 The Court also noted that "Congress could have written
§ 841(b)(1)(C) to impose a mandatory minimum when the underlying crime
'contributes to' death or serious bodily injury, or adopted a modified causation
test tailored to cases involving concurrent causes, as five States have done. It
chose instead to use language that imports but-for causality." 99 Accordingly,
the Court concluded, "at least where use of the drug distributed by the
defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim's death or
serious bodily injury, a defendant cannot be liable under the penalty
enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) unless such use is a but-

87. Id. at 206.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 207.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 207-08.
95. Id. at 208.
96. Id. (citing United States v. Burrage, 867 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2012), rev'd, 571 U.S.
204 (2014)).
97. See id. at 214, 219.
98. Id. at 212-14.
99. Id. at 216 (citations omitted).
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for cause of the death or injury." ' But-for causality must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, which can be a heavy burden for the prosecution.' 0
It should be noted that in state court, the usefulness of Burrage will
depend on whether the language of the relevant state drug-induced death
statute uses "but-for" or "contributes to" language. Indeed, in Burrage, the
Supreme Court distinguished the federal statute from five state statutes that
use the phrase "contributes to death or serious bodily injury or adopted a
modified causation test tailored to cases involving concurrent causes, as five
States have done."1 02 Of course, since this is an issue of statutory
interpretation, state courts are free to decline to follow Burrage regardless of
the statutory language at issue. Nevertheless, Burrage makes a compelling
argument for applying its rule absent express statutory language that modifies
traditional causation principles and is a useful case if but-for causation is being
litigated in state court.
2.

Proximate Causationand Foreseeability

In addition to but-for causation, traditional criminal causation principles
also require proof of proximate causation. Proximate cause, also called legal
cause, is a way of identifying a but-for cause
[t]hat we're particularly interested in, often because we want to
eliminate it. We want to eliminate arson, but we don't want to
eliminate oxygen, so we call arson the cause of a fire set for an
improper purpose rather than calling the presence of oxygen in the
atmosphere the cause, though it is a but-for cause just as the arsonist's
setting the fire is. 103

Proximate cause requires proof that death was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's conduct. However, some statutes use a strict
liability approach. Most circuits have concluded that the federal drug-induced

100. Id. at 218-19.
101. See Gilson et al., supra note 82.
102. 571 U.S. at 216 (internal quotations omitted); see also, e.g., People v. XuHui Li, 67
N.Y.S.3d 1, 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15 (McKinney, Westlaw
through L.2019, chapters I to 8)). In XuHui Li, the court declined to apply Burrage in a druginduced death manslaughter prosecution on the grounds that "Burrage interpreted specific
causation language employed by Congress in the federal Controlled Substances Act, which
language is not included in New York's manslaughter statute." 67 N.Y.S.3d, at 6.
103. United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 2010).
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death statute does not require proof of proximate cause.1 04 Because the United
States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, 05 litigants should continue
to request a proximate causation instruction if only to preserve the issue.1 06
3.

Intervening CauseLimitation

Under traditional criminal law causation principles, the intervening cause
rule provides an important limit on the scope of criminal liability. Under this
principle, if an independent act intervenes between the defendant's conduct
and the result, it can break the causal chain and defeat proximate cause. 0 7 A
leading treatise on causation explained the idea this way: "[t]he free,
deliberate, and informed intervention of a second person, who intends to
exploit the situation created by the first, but is not acting in concert with him,
is normally held to relieve the first actor of criminal responsibility." 08 Based
on this principle, courts have held outside of the drug-induced homicide
context that "the causal link between [a defendant's] conduct and the victim's
death [is] severed when the victim exercised his own free will."1 09
Applying this rule to drug-induced death prosecutions would have the
potential to significantly limit their reach since one could plausibly describe
most drug users themselves as intervening actors. Few drug users are
pressured by the distributor to use drugs; they make the choice to obtain and
use the drug themselves. Indeed, the user often actively seeks out a seller to

104. See United States v. Alvarado, 816 F.3d 242, 250 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing United States
v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 789 (4th Cir. 1990)) ("[W]e conclude that the district court fairly stated
the controlling law in refusing to instruct the jury that § 841 (b)(1)(C) contains a foreseeability
requirement."); see also United States v. Burkholder, 816 F.3d 607, 621 (10th Cir. 2016) ("We
thus hold that § 841(b)(1)(E)'s provision that 'death . . results from the use' of a Schedule III
controlled substance requires only proof of but-for causation.") (omission in original); United
States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250 (11th Cir. 2011). In Webb, the court cited multiple cases
and noted that "some focus on foreseeability and others on proximate cause." 655 F.3d at 1250.
105. One of the two questions on which the Supreme Court granted review in Burrage was
"[w]hether the defendant may be convicted under the 'death results' provision . . without
separately instructing the jury that it must decide whether the victim's death by drug overdose
was a foreseeable result of the defendant's drug-trafficking offense." 571 U.S. at 208 (citing
Burrage v. United States, 569 U.S. 957 (2013)). However, the court "[found] it necessary to
decide only" the question of actual causation. Id. at 210.
106. See Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 621-24 (Briscoe, J., dissenting), for a thorough and
reasoned argument that the federal statute requires proof of foreseeability. Judge Briscoe
believed the statute should be read to include a proximate cause requirement, stating he was "not
persuaded that Congress clearly intended to impose a strict liability on a criminal defendant for
any death resulting from his drug-trafficking offense." Id at 624.
107. See HART & HONORt, supra note 79, at 326.
108. Id.
109. E.g., Lewis v. Alabama, 474 So.2d 766, 771 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1985).
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buy drugs. Moreover, the user controls the amount she chooses to ingest, and
whether or not to use more than one drug at the same time. And so, even
though a person's decision to use drugs may be the product of a substance use
disorder, it would still seem to qualify as an act of free will within the
intervening cause doctrine. Nevertheless, courts have generally been skeptical
of the idea, with at least one going so far as to state that suicide would not
defeat causation under the federal drug-induced death statute. 10
Even so, there is limited jurisprudence on intervening cause in these
cases. As with proximate causation, the Supreme Court's decision in Burrage
did not directly address whether the intervening cause rule should apply to
federal drug-induced death cases."'
In addition, one court expressed concern in dicta about the prospect of
permitting liability under this provision where the victim committed suicide:
That could lead to some strange results. Suppose that, unbeknownst
to the seller of an illegal drug, his buyer was intending to commit
suicide by taking an overdose of drugs, bought from that seller, that
were not abnormally strong, and in addition the seller had informed
the buyer of the strength of the drugs, so that there was no reasonable
likelihood of an accidental overdose.112
Accordingly, as with proximate cause above, defendants should consider
requesting an intervening cause instruction if only to preserve the issue.
III. CHALLENGING THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE" 3

This section provides examples of possible ways defendants can
challenge the scientific claims upon which drug-induced homicide
prosecutions are based. Recall that if a jurisdiction uses a but-for test, Burrage

110. Zanuccoli v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 2d 109, 112 (D. Mass. 2006) ("Suicide
through heroin overdose meets the statute's terms, because it is a 'death resulting from the use
of the heroin, irrespective of the victim's state of mind.").
111. See United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 951 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002) ("While other
circuits have held that the 'death or serious bodily injury' enhancement contained in § 841(b)(1)
does not require a finding of proximate cause or foreseeability of death, these circuits have not
addressed whether there is an intervening cause exception to the enhancement provision.... In
light of our disposition, we too need not decide whether there can be an intervening cause
exception to the enhancement provision.").
112. United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir. 2010).
113. This section is adopted and excerpted from an article originally published with
the Georgia State University Law Review. The original text, The Overdose/HomicideEpidemic,
can be found at 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 983 (2018).
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requires prosecutors charging drug-induced homicide cases to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the distributed drug was the but-for cause of death.114
The experts at trial were unable to prove this when the decedent was on a
cocktail of other drugs." Accordingly, the but-for test requires the states
using that approach to provide a medical expert to confirm that the decedent
would still be alive if he had not taken the specific drug given to him by the
accused. This section discusses tactics to consider in such circumstances.
A.

Ask the Court for Expert Funds to Hire a Toxicologist or Forensic
Pathologist/MedicalExaminer

A toxicologist-for the state or the defense will be hard-pressed to
make an exclusive but-for finding if there are other drugs or supplements in
the decedent's blood stream.11 6 A forensic pathologist/medical examiner may
be able to challenge the autopsy finding by looking at the medical history of
the decedent to determine whether an alternate cause of death exists."
B. Ask for a Daubert or Frye Hearing to Challenge the State Expert's
But-For Testimony
Federal Rule of Evidence 702's"
expert witness admissibility
requirement, expounded upon by the Daubertv. MerrillDow Pharm., Inc. 119
decision, requires that experts offer some kind of specialized knowledge, that
their testimony be based on sufficient facts or data, and that it be the product

114. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210, 216 (2014).
115. Id. at 216-19.
116. See Erin Schumaker, Almost All Overdose Deaths Involve Multiple Drugs, Federal
Report
Shows,
HUFFPosT
(Dec.
12,
2018
8:30
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/multiple-drugs-overdose-deaths-report us_5cOfe121e4
b06484c9ff3b2f.
117. See Clarissa Bryan, Beyond Bedsores: InvestigatingSuspicious Deaths, Self-Inflicted
Injuries, and Science in a Coroner System, 7 NAELA J. 199, 210 (2011) ("Lay coroners rely
heavily on the external condition of the deceased and any available medical records when
determining cause and manner of death.").
118. A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
119. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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of reliable methodology that has been properly applied to the present case.120
Daubert requires trial judges in both civil and criminal proceedings to
determine "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid."121

Defense attorneys can ask the court for a Daubert hearing to challenge
the state expert's finding that the distributed drug is the but-for cause of the
decedent's death. Useful queries address underlying health conditions, herbal
supplements, the toxicology report, the autopsy report if one was performed,
and even the death certificate (which may say homicide as the manner of death
and overdose as the cause of death before any toxicology analysis was even
performed). Finally, as discussed below, defense attorneys can challenge the
state expert's expertise and impartiality. If a coroner determined the cause or
manner of death, that means a lay person-likely with no scientific
backgrounddetermined the death was an overdose and a homicide. Death
investigations are not standardized across the United States. No national
qualifications exist for death investigators, and often no state qualifications
beyond being an adult and living in the jurisdiction neither quality being
based on skill, training, or expertise. Instead, death investigators can simply
be local officials in rural counties. 122
Some jurisdictions have Fryel23 hearings instead of Dauberthearings. In
these hearings, the "general acceptance" test looks to the scientific community
to determine whether the evidence in question has a valid, scientific basis.
Despite the different frameworks, the outcome of these hearings is unlikely to
vary substantially. The bottom line is that it is important to adequately
scrutinize the scientific evidence presented.
C.

Consider the State Official's Expertise

Of central importance is whether the jurisdiction has a coroner or a
medical examiner system. In a coroner system or a mixed medical examinercoroner system, the coroner may have decided the manner of death (homicide,
suicide, accident, natural, or undetermined), and may also have determined

120. Id.
121. Id. at 592-93.
122. As one example, Justice Scalia died in West Texas, where the death investigation was
governed by the justice of the peace and local judge. Justice Scalia was found in bed with a
pillow over his head, and his breathing apparatus shut off and yet the justice of the peace
declared the death to be from natural causes, issued his findings over the phone, and never had
an official examine the body. There was no autopsy. Ira P. Robbins, A Deadly Pair: Conflicts of
Interest Between Death Investigators and Prosecutors,79 OHIO ST. L. J. 902, 903 (2018).
123. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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the cause of death: an overdose. Coroners and medical examiners differ
significantly in their qualifications.' 24
A medical examiner is a physician who is appointed to determine cause
and manner of death. Notably, the medical examiner also determines whether
an autopsy should be conducted.1 25 A medical examiner is generally a forensic
pathologist who has received training in anatomical or clinical pathology and
received formal training in forensic pathology in a fellowship program.1 26
Forensic pathology is a "subspecialty of medicine devoted to the investigation
and physical examination of persons who die a sudden, unexpected,
suspicious, or violent death."1 27
A coroner, as noted above, is typically a county elected official, tasked
with investigating deaths and with determining what the manner of death was,
whether an autopsy is necessary, and in some jurisdictions, identifying the
cause of death. 128 Despite this range of medico-scientific responsibilities,
coroners are not required to have any medical background. They must only
meet minimum statutory requirements such as residency and minimum age.1 29
On the extreme end of the spectrum, in Indiana two seventeen-year-old high
school seniors have been appointed deputy coroner.1 30 Accordingly, it should

124. For more on comparisons between coroners and medical examiners, including
subconscious and conscious bias in these roles, see Beety, supra note 113.
125. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE U.S.:
A
PATH
FORWARD
248
(Nat'l
Acad.
Press
2009),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/ 2 2 8 0 9 1 .pdf.
126. See id
127. Id. at 256.
128. See id at 247.
129. Id. ("Typical qualifications for election as a coroner include being a registered voter,
attaining a minimum age requirement ranging from 18 to 25 years, being free of felony
convictions, and completing a training program, which can be of varying length. The selection
pool is local and small.").
130. Id. (citing Associated Press, Teen Becomes Indiana's Youngest Coroner, NEWS OK,
(May 12, 2007, 8:50 AM), https://newsok.com/article/3053301/teen-becomes-indianasyoungest-coroner) ("Jurisdictions vary in terms of the required qualifications, skills, and
activities for death investigators. . . . Recently a 17-year old high school senior successfully
completed the coroner's examination and was appointed a deputy coroner in an Indiana
jurisdiction."). That deputy coroner was appointed by her father, the county coroner. See Linsey
Davis, Amanda Barnett, Indiana'sYoungest Death Investigator, WTHR: NEWS (Apr. 15, 2016,
4:13 AM), https://www.wthr.com/article/amanda-barnett-indianas-youngest-death-investigator.
Another teen was appointed more recently. Rachael Krause, High School Works Clark County 's
Youngest Deputy Coroner, WAVE 3 NEWS (Aug.
15,
2018,
3:01
PM),
http://www.wave3. com/story/37527919/high-school-senior-works-as-clark-countys-youngestdeputy-coroner. The only academic training required was a forty-hour course. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/8

24

Beety et al.: Drug-Induced Homicide: Challenges and Strategies in Criminal Defe
2019]

DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE DEFENSES

731

come as no surprise that the continuation of the coroner system has been
repeatedly and increasingly questioned.131
Indeed, the push for the elimination of the coroner system and
replacement by scientifically trained individuals began in the 1920s. 132 Yet
the coroner system remains today in some states. This is concerning because,
depending on the jurisdiction, either laypeople or medical experts are given
the same taskdetermining how a person died and the determinations of
both are typically perceived as carrying the same scientific rigor even when
that perception is entirely inaccurate. 133 Such a determination is vital to the
existence of any criminal investigation or prosecution that follows.
D. Challenging the Scientific Basis of Death Certificates and Medical
ExaminerAutopsy Reports
1.

Query Determinationof Cause ofDeath as Overdose

Coroners, and even medical examiners, are increasingly playing fast and
loose with determinations of overdose as the cause of death without even

&

131. See Kelly K. Dineen, Addressing PrescriptionOpioid Abuse Concerns in Context:
Synchronizing Policy Solutions to Multiple Complex Public Health Problems, 40 LAW
PSYCHOL. REv. 1, 41-42 (2016) ("Availability bias may also extend to the decisions made
by coroners and physicians in selecting a cause of death on death certificates. The significant
publicity around opioid related deaths may increase the attribution of death to opioid poisoning
rather than one of the multiple other drugs or alcohol present in the systems of most victims.").
132. See Bryan, supra note 117, at 216 ("If leading scientists in 1928 deemed the coroner
system 'anachronistic,' it is difficult to justify its continued operation today. The apparent
shortfall of the system to engage medical science in the performance of death investigations is
simply unacceptable.").
As early as 1928, even before the advent of modern forensic science, experts began
recommending that the office of coroner be abolished in favor of scientifically trained
staff. Almost 90 years later, this advice appears to have been ignored in some areas,
where coroners may be eligible for election simply by being registered voters with
clean criminal records.
Alex Breitler, 'Too much power': Rethinking sheriff-coroner role, RECORDNET.COM (Dec. 9,
2017, 4:26 PM), https://www.recordnet.com/news/20171209/too-much-power-rethinkingsheriff-coroner-role.
133. See Bryan, supra note 117, at 210:
Lay coroners rely heavily on the external condition of the deceased and any available
medical records when determining cause and manner of death. At best, this approach
is divorced from the scientific method (which requires a standardization of methods
of investigation and the use of reliable modes of testing and inquiry) and relies too
heavily on instinct, practical experience, or the completeness of medical records. At
worst, it is completely ad hoc and involves a large potential for bias if the
county coroner knows the deceased or their family.
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having conducted a toxicology analysis. This is particularly true with state
coroners overwhelmed by the number of deaths in their jurisdictions.
Importantly, coroners in some jurisdictions determine both the cause of
death (overdose) as well as the manner of death (homicide or accident). In
Pennsylvania, where county coroners determine both the manner and cause of
death, "determining causation related to overdoses is subjective and can vary
widely depending on the investigative efforts/abilities of the coroner and the
evidence available for review, which results in inherent difficulties in making
causation decisions."1 34 Some deaths in Pennsylvania have been reported as
overdoses with no toxicology reports.1 35 Indeed, coroners and medical
examiners increasingly find cause of death overdose without eliminating
other causes. 136
2.

Query Determination of Manner of Death as Accident or
Homicidefor Evidence ofBias

Medical examiners and some coroners can legally determine the manner
of death for an overdose to be an accident or a homicide. Under the National
Association of Medical Examiners (NAME) standards, an overdose can be
determined as an accident or a homicide.1 37 If the death certificate names the
death a homicide, defense attorneys can question this description and raise the
issue of bias on the part of the medical examiner or coroner (ME/C). In some

134. DEA PHILADELPHIA FIELD DIVISION, INTELLIGENCE REPORT: ANALYSIS OF DRUGRELATED OVERDOSE DEATHS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 2015, 28 (July 2016) (citing Ben Allen, No

StandardExists in PA to Accurately Track Heroin Overdose Deaths, WITF (Apr. 9, 2015, 4:33
AM),
http://www.witf.org/news/2015/04/how-accurate-are-the-states-heroin-overdose-statis
tics.php. At the time, Pennsylvania ranked eighth in the country for drug overdose deaths,
according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Id. at 1 (citing Drug Overdose
Mortality

by

State,

CENTERS

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL

AND

PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/drugpoisoningmortality/drugpoisoning.htm
(last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
135. Id. at 28.
136. But see Frank Main, Kratom, Health Supplement Targeted by FDA, Linked to 9
Deaths in Cook County, CHI. SUN TIMES (Mar.
5, 2018,
11:32 AM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/kratom-health-supplement-targeted-by-fda-linked-to-8deaths-in-cook-county ("According to Cook County medical examiner's records, there have
been nine cases since 2016 in which mitragynine was listed as a cause of death-in each instance
along with at least one drug, often opioids such as heroin or fentanyl."); Charles Ornstein,
Measuringthe Toll of the Opioid Epidemic Is Tougher Than It Seems, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 13,
2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/measuring-the-toll-of-the-opioid-epidemicis-tougher-than-it-seems.
137. See Gregory G. Davis et al., National Association of Medical Examiners Position
Paper:Recommendationsfor the Investigation, Diagnosis, and Certification ofDeaths Related
to OpioidDrugs,3 ACAD. FORENSIC PATHOL. 77, 81 (2013).
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cases, these actors may be biased even 38to the extent of being a de facto
"member[] of the prosecution's 'team."'1
Without a clear toxicology report to comply with Burrage, a death
certificate of homicide-rather than accident is valuable support for a druginduced homicide prosecution. Importantly, it is NAME's position that
"medical examiner and coroner independence is an absolute necessity for
professional death investigation."139 But there are many strong influences on
coroners and medical examiners.
One is politics. Recall that coroners are elected officials. "Coroners are
independent of law enforcement and other agencies, but as elected officials
they must be responsive to the public, and this may lead to difficulty in making
unpopular determinations of the cause and manner of death."' 4 0 Politics may
shape or even predetermine the finding.
Another is personal experience and social network effects. Take, for
example, the approach of Lycoming County Coroner Charles Kiessling Jr.,
president of the Pennsylvania State Coroners Association. Typically
determining overdose deaths as accidents, when a friend's son died of an
overdose, he changed his policy to identify all heroin overdose deaths as
homicides in order to send a message. "If you chose to sell heroin, you're
killing people and you're murdering people. You're just as dead from a shot
of heroin as if someone puts a bullet in you.

. .

. Calling these accidents is

sweeping it under the rug."141
A powerful influence on ME/Cs comes from the prosecutor and law
enforcement. Even though NAME deems medicolegal death investigations to
be public health rather than criminal justice functions,1 42 there are few
restrictions on prosecutors or law enforcement involvement in death

138. Mark Hansen, CSIBreakdown: A Clash Between ProsecutorsandForensic Scientists
in Minnesota Bares A Long-Standing EthicalDispute, 96 A.B.A J. 44, 46 (Nov. 2010); see also
Robbins, supra note 122, at 903.
139. Judy Melinek et al., National Association of Medical Examiners Position Paper:
Medical Examiner, Coroner, and Forensic Pathologist Independence, 3 ACAD. FORENSIC
PATHOL. 93, 94 (2013).
140. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 125, at 247.
141. Eric Scicchitano, Heroin Deaths Labeled Killings: Lycoming Coroner Says Move
Will
Draw
Attention
to
Epidemic,
DAILY
ITEM
(Mar.
22,
2016),
https://www.dailyitem.com/news/heroin-deaths-labeled-killings-lycoming-coroner-says-movewill-draw/articledc9e2518-fO7e-1le5-9fa7-d7680fbbfb52.html;
see also Sarah Larimer,
Heroin Overdoses Aren't Accidents in This Country. They're Now Homicides., WASH. POST
(Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2016/03/30/heroinoverdoses-arent-accidents-in-this-county-theyre-now-homicides/?utmterm=. 63df5 66e 1 f4c.
142. Melinek et al., supra note 139, at 97 ("Unlike with crime laboratory examinations,
which are usually generated to determine guilt or innocence, the medicolegal death investigation
is primarily a public health effort.").
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investigations. 143 "In rural counties, the coroner may be more likely to see
himself as part of the law enforcement team sharing the same goals as the
44
police and prosecutors, which results in a situation known as 'role effects."1
Indeed, some of the investigative staff for the coroner may be former police
officers, 4 5 or in the extreme cases of Nevada, Montana, and California, the
coroner may also be the sheriff.1 46 As the Minnesota Supreme Court said
when reversing a conviction where the prosecutor interfered with the
defense's forensic pathologist expert, "some police and prosecutors tend to
view government-employed
47
prosecution's 'team."'1

forensic

scientists .

.

. as

members of the

A survey of NAME members found that seventy percent of respondents
had been subjected to outside pressures to influence their findings, and when
they resisted these pressures, many of the medical examiners suffered
negative consequences.1 48 Of responding pathologists, twenty-two percent
had "experienced political pressure to change death certificates from elected
and/or appointed political officials." 14 The NAME Standards state that death

143. See LASALLE, supra note 3, at 25 (citing HEROIN EPIDEMIC: THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S
HEROIN AND OPIOID TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (last updated May 4, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndoh/heroin-epidemic) (describing the U.S. Attorney's Heroin
and Opioid Task Force in the Northern District of Ohio: "The Task Force developed specific
protocols to treat fatal heroin overdoses as crime scenes, with investigators and prosecutors
going to every scene to gather evidence.").
It is also not surprising to find that the coroner was present at the autopsy. The coroner
may be employed by the local sheriff and may not be an independent officer or a
separately elected official; he or she may be paying the pathologist to perform the
autopsy and all the other autopsies in the county. Also present at the autopsy may be
the investigating officers and all sorts of other law enforcement agents. Prior to
conducting the autopsy these investigating officers will have 'briefed' the pathologist
about to perform the autopsy about their investigation and what they believed to have
occurred. In this regularly occurring scenario, you can be certain what the resultant
findings will be: homicide.
Mark A. Broughton, Understandingand Addressing the Challenges in Homicide and Murder
Defense Cases, in HOMICIDE DEFENSE STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING
HOMICIDE CASES AND DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE DEFENSE TECHNIQUES 7, 25 (Thomas

&

Reuters/Aspatore 2014).
144. See Beety, supra note 113, at 1000.
145. See Paul MacMahon, The Inquest andthe Virtues ofSoft Adjudication, 33 YALE L.
POL'Y REV. 275, 304 (2015) (citing JOHN COOPER, INQUESTS 24 (Hart Publishing Ltd 2011).
146. See, e.g., S. 1189, 2016 Leg. (Cal. 2016) ("Existing law authorizes the board of
supervisors of a county to consolidate the duties of certain county offices in one or more of
specified combinations, including, but not limited to, sheriff and coroner, district attorney and
coroner, and public administrator and coroner.").
147. Hansen, supra note 138, at 46.
148. Melinek et al., supra note 139, at 93.
149. Id. at 94.
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investigators "must investigate cooperatively with, but independent from, law
enforcement and prosecutors. The parallel investigation promotes neutral and
objective medical assessment of the cause and manner of death." 50
Furthermore,
"[t]o
promote
competent
and
objective
death
investigations: .

.

. Medico-legal death investigation officers should operate

without any undue influence from

law enforcement agencies and

prosecutors."' 5

It is important to keep in mind that ME/Cs, "aware of the desired result
of their analyses, might be influenced-even unwittingly to interpret
ambiguous data or fabricate results to support the police theory."1 52 "Tunnel
vision has been shown to have an effect in the initial stages of criminal
investigations and this is a significant issue because all subsequent stages of
the investigation will potentially be impacted by the information generated at
this initial stage."

153

E A Final Thought
As observers and scholars have noted, scientific evidence has a different
weight and status because it is often seen as impartial and impervious to
bias.1 54 When a death certificate says homicide, that finding is assumed to be
the result of an independent determination, separate and apart from the role of
the police and prosecutor in the criminal investigation. Similarly, when an
autopsy report determines the manner of death as overdose, the report is
viewed as scientific evidence of a higher status than most of the non-scientific
evidence that will be presented against the defendant at trial. 1 These notions
of absolute impartiality, as hopefully clarified above, are quite false.

150. NAT'L Ass'N OF
STANDARDS 1 (Oct. 16, 2006).

MED.

EXAMINERS,

FORENSIC

AUTOPSY

PERFORMANCE

&

151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 293 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also MacMahon,
supra note 145, at 306 ("Often, however, even those coroners who are elected directly are likely
to be deeply embedded in law enforcement-too deeply embedded to provide independent
oversight.").
153. Sherry Nakhaeizadeh et al., The Emergence of Cognitive Bias in Forensic Science
and CriminalInvestigations, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 527, 539 (2015) (citing Findley
Scott, supra note 152).
154. Id. at 542 (citing Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Needfor a Research Culture in the
Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725 (2011)).
155. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 125, at 85-88.
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

There are numerous problems with drug-induced homicide prosecutions
from a policy perspective. These include being counterproductive to their
stated goal of reducing overdose deaths, targeting the drug users for
prosecution, and disproportionately affecting people of color.
A.

Drug-Induced Homicide Prosecutions Actually Increase Risk of
Overdose Deaths

The ostensible purpose of drug-induced homicide prosecutions is to
reduce overdose deaths. As former Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated,
"Synthetic opioids like fentanyl killed more Americans than any other kind of
drug in 2016 .... In response, the Department of Justice tripled our fentanyl
prosecutions in 2017."156 However the deterrence approach to problematic
drug use is not very effective. As demonstrated in study after study, tough law
enforcement practices do not curb problematic drug use on a large scale.1 7
To make matters worse, drug-induced homicide prosecutions are actually
counterproductive to the goal of reducing overdose deaths. On the contrary,
they increase the risk.
1.

For Individuals Experiencing Opioid Use Disorder,
IncarcerationIncreases Their Risk ofDeathfrom Overdose

"

Because get-tough federal laws prevent Medicaid from funding health
care in federal and state correctional facilities, few are able to afford evidencebased treatment, particularly treatment that includes the use of medication.'5
This matters because people experiencing Opioid Use Disorder (OUD) who
are sentenced to facilities that offer only abstinence-based programming-or
force inmates to go "cold turkey" will lose their accumulated tolerance to

156. Katie Zezima & Sari Horwitz, Federal, State Authorities Step Up Fentanyl
Prosecutions As Drug Drives Spike in Overdoses, WASH. POST (June 7, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-state-authorities-step-up-fentanyl-prosecu
tions-as-drug-drives-spike-in-overdoses/2018/06/07/5631edd0-69c0-11e8-bf8c-f9ed2e672adf_
story.html?noredirect=on&utmterm=.d6flacOa6721.
157. See LASALLE, supra note 3, at 39.
158. See Leo Beletsky et al., FatalRe-Entry: Legal and ProgrammaticOpportunitiesto
Curb Opioid Overdose Among Individuals Newly Releasedfrom Incarceration,7 NE. U. L. J.
155, 206 (2015) (citing § 1905 of the Social Security Act).
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opioids while serving their sentences, but their brain chemistry will not reset
to the point of losing cravings. 5 9
If these individuals reenter society without being provided evidencebased treatment immediately, there is a very high risk that their brain
chemistry's cravings, combined with the emotional and social trauma of
reentry, will lead them to consume opioids.1 60 Without their physical
tolerance to the drugs, and with the heightened potency of heroin and the
increased lacing of heroin and other drugs with illicitly-produced fentanyl, the
risk of accidental overdose and death increases astronomically.161 Particularly
during the critical first weeks after release-even from mere jail terms
overdoses are staggeringly common, and the risk of death from heroin
overdoses jumps as high as 130 times greater than the general public.1 62
2.

Drug-Induced Homicide Arrests and Prosecutions
Undermine Good Samaritan Laws, Increasing Overdose
Deaths

If anti-overdose medicine is administered, overdoses do not have to turn
into deaths.1 63 Unfortunately, overdose witnesses are reluctant to dial 911 for
fear of legal consequences more than fifty percent according to
research 64 because the witness is often a fellow user and a 911 call brings
out the police as well as emergency medical personnel. Recognizing this, over
two-thirds of states have passed Good Samaritan laws.1 65 These laws aim to
alleviate the fear of calling 911 in the event of an overdose by eliminating or
reducing the criminal penalties to the caller.

159. See id. at 164 (first citing Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., Return to Drug Use and
Overdose After Release from Prison: A Qualitative Study of Risk and Protective Factors, 7
ADDICTION SCI. & CLINICAL PRAC. at 1, 5 (2012); then citing Michelle McKenzie et al.,
Overcoming Obstacles to Implementing Methadone Maintenancefor Prisoners:Implications
for Policy andPractice,5 J. OPIOID MANAG. 219 (2009); and then citing WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
PREVENTION OF ACUTE DRUG-RELATED MORTALITY IN PRISON POPULATIONS DURING THE
IMMEDIATE POST-RELEASE PERIOD 10-11 (2010)).

160. See id. (citing Binswanger et al., supra note 159, at 7).
161. See id. (first citing Binswanger et al., supra note 159; then citing McKenzie et al.,
supra note 159; and then citing WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 159, at 10-11).
162. See id. at 156 (footnote omitted).
163. See Edward W. Boyer, Management of OpioidAnalgesic Overdose, 367 N. ENG. J.
MED. 146, 150-53 (2012) (discussing the use of naloxone to treat overdoses).
164. See LASALLE, supra note 3, at 40.
165. See PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE POLICY SYSTEM, GOOD SAMARITAN OVERDOSE
PREVENTION LAWS, http://www.pdaps.org/datasets/good-samaritan-overdose-laws-150169
5153 (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
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Unfortunately, the public has relatively low awareness and understanding
of these laws. On the flip side, there is strong media coverage of drug-induced
homicide policy, arrests, and prosecutions.1 66 Law enforcement agencies see
drug-induced homicide as effective signaling devices, and while that is a
mistaken perception as to reducing problematic drug use and overdoses, it is
accurate in terms of putting the word out that witnesses to an overdose may
be arrested and charged.1 67 The increasingly common practice 168 of treating
every overdose scene as a crime scene becomes well known among users.
Even if user-witnesses are overestimating the legal risk of calling 911, it has
a chilling effect that may help explain the relatively anemic impact of Good
Samaritan laws on help-seeking observed thus far.1 69 If fellow users
witnessing an overdose do not call 911 -and presuming that they have not
been trained and provided with naloxone to administer themselves-then
entirely avoidable deaths will inevitably follow.
B.

Most Drug-InducedHomicide Defendants Are Not DrugDealers

Law enforcement agencies may reap some political dividends for
appearing tough on opioid sellers, but in practice most arrests and
prosecutions are not of "dealers" or producers or "kingpins" but of fellow
users. This runs counter to the general approach to American drug laws of
distinguishing between distribution and mere possession for personal use. It
also runs counter to the public statements made by some prominent officials,
such as former Ocean County, New Jersey, Prosecutor Joseph Coronato, that
"[i]f you're going to be a dealer, and that heroin is going to kill somebody,
we're going to take that death, that overdose . . . and treat it as a homicide." 7 1
Research shows that a majority of drug-induced homicide cases prosecute
mere users who shared drugs with a friend or family member, not members of
the drug trade. Our analysis of prosecutions reported in the media indicates
that prosecutors usually charge friends and romantic partners of the overdose
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victim.' 7 ' Another similar study conducted by the Drug Policy Alliance had
similar findings.1 72

Accordingly, if prosecutors are trying to "send a message" to people in
the drug trade but are only targeting end users, this strategy is bound to fail. It
is made all the worse by basing the strategy in law on predicate distribution
charges that make little sense in light of the joint-user doctrine.
C. DisparateImpact on People of Color
Our preliminary analysis of the limited data available suggests that druginduced homicide prosecutions disproportionately target people of color.
People of color accused of drug-induced homicide or similar crimes are
sentenced to 2.1 years more, on average, than whites.1 73 This pattern harkens
back to one of the most egregious elements1 74 of the War on Drugs.
From the Public Health perspective, the racial dynamics of these
prosecutions highlight the problem of the low access to health care that is
disproportionately experienced by people of color. Ironically, in areas where
criminal justice institutions and actors are striving to bring increased access
to services, these prosecutions may further undermine trust in police among
people of color, steering them away from even beneficial police contact and
inadvertently worsening disparities in access to care.
V.

CONCLUSION

The number of drug-induced homicide prosecutions continues to rise.
This Article is our effort to empower the defense to challenge these charges:
as baseless in alleging distribution, as unsubstantiated but-for causes of death,
as damaging to public safety, and as heightening the harm of the current opioid
crisis. Our hope is to turn away from prosecutions to solve the crisis, and turn
toward public health solutions.
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